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Abstract: The reform of article 1 of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States in June 2011, 
has incorporated into the constitutional text the clause of interpretation according to international treaties 
on human rights as the hermeneutic criteria which domestic judges must adopt in their verdicts. This 
clause reflects an evolutionary tendency which the Constitutional States are adopting, generating a new 
understanding of the state function as a whole, especially of the judiciary function. Despite this aperture, 
which enables the application of this type of hermeneutic techniques, it is possible to see how in some 
jurisprudential criteria a restraining posture is adopted towards international regulatory contents in human 
rights, leaving aside the possibility of an interpretative process of harmonization 
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Summary: I. THE JUDGE’S OBLIGATION TO ELABORATE A HARMONIC PROCESS FOR THE INTERPRETATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS; II. GENERAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION 
ADVANCED FORMULA FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS DOGMATIC; II.1. The interpretation of human rights as an 
open to the public and social power challenge.  
 
I. THE JUDGE’S OBLIGATION TO ELABORATE A HARMONIC PROCESS FOR THE 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The reform of article 1 of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States 
made in June 2011 has incorporated the clause of consistent interpretation into the 
constitutional text. This way, the constitutional rule contains a valuable pattern and 
constitutes a vanguard position by establishing that: “the laws related to human rights 
will be interpreted according to this Constitution and to the international treaties on the 
matter giving at all times the widest protection to people” (CABALLERO OCHOA, 
J.L., 2012: 105). Therefore, the clause of consistent interpretation and the pro person 
principle are formally established in the constitutional disposition, both mentioned 
aspects having their origins in the scope of international law and defined as hermeneutic 
criteria which inform about the scope of human rights (PINTO, M., 1997: 163; OLANO 
GARCÍA, H.A., 2006: 199). This novel disposition reflects an evolutionary tendency of 
1  Doctor of Law from Universidad de Jaén (Spain), Executive advisor at the Human Rights Commission 
of the State of Yucatan (Mexico) Professor of the Faculty of Law at the Autonomous University of 
Yucatan (Mexico), Member of the National System of Researchers (geofreyangulo@gmail.com). 
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opening which present Constitutional States are adopting by establishing that 
international treaties on human rights have constitutional hierarchy and on the other 
hand, it implies that laws and actions can be controlled according to not only 
constitutional rights but to human rights as well. 
 
This type of clauses or hermeneutic techniques have been incorporated already I 
other constitutional frames, like the European, which allows to prove that the present 
tendency is from a ductile and international State. Thus, for example, the German 
Constitution points out that: “The rules of international law form an essential part of the 
federal legal system, they will have priority over domestic laws and will create direct 
rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory”; the same Fundamental Law 
also states: “If in a judicial litigation it was uncertain if a rule of international law forms 
part of federal law and if it directly creates rights and duties for individuals, the court 
will have to gather and deliver the enunciating to the Constitutional Federal Court.”  In 
Austria: “The rules and laws generally acknowledged by International Law are 
considered part of the federal system.” Meanwhile in Portugal, in its article 16.2 it is 
stipulated that: “The constitutional and legal precepts related to fundamental rights must 
be interpreted and integrated in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights”.  
 
Meanwhile the Spanish Constitution of 1978 in its article 10.2 utters that: “The 
rules and laws related to the fundamental rights and to the liberties acknowledged by the 
Constitution will be interpreted according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the treaties and international agreements on the same subjects, ratified by Spain”. 
The Greek Constitution declares: “The rules and laws generally accepted by 
International Law and all international treaties on the matter once ratified through the 
legislative process and enforced according to their own dispositions, form part of 
Hellenic Law and will have a higher degree of importance when in conflict with 
domestic law. Ireland also accepts that the main and recognized principles of 
international law as the rule of conduct in Ireland’s relationships with other States. 
Meanwhile the Italian Constitution states that: “The Italian legal system shall adapt to 
the rules and dispositions from international law which are generally acknowledged”.  
(PFEFFER URQUIAGA, E. 2003: 467-484). All this has influenced the Latin American 
countries which have given constitutional hierarchy to international treaties on Human 
Rights, such as: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Paraguay and very 
recently the Dominican Republic in its new Constitution proclaimed in January 26, 
2010. 
 
It is worth mentioning that in Mexico there is legal precedent for the use of this 
international hermeneutic exercise, in articles 6 & 7 of the Federal Law to Prevent and 
Eliminate Discrimination of 2003. These legal advances on human rights were already 
located before the constitutional reform in a manner that obligates all authorities to act 
in congruence with international treaties about non-discrimination. It even goes beyond 
by not only incorporating treaties but also international precedents adopted by the 
American Court and the recommendations of the American Commission of Human 
Rights. It also includes the pro person principle in the manner that when different 
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interpretations are possible, the one which protects people or groups victimized by 
discrimination must be preferred. In this sense, meaningful would also be the possibility 
of establishing in the first paragraph of article one of the Constitution the obligation of 
the Mexican State to incorporate a mechanism that would give acceptance and the 
follow-up to the abiding of the American Commission of Human Rights 
recommendations and not expect to wait for the Mexican State to be sued and a 
complaint filed to the Organization of American States for not abiding by the 
recommendations of the American Commission2 (BECERRA RAMÍREZ, M., 2007: 
63-113). 
 
Meanwhile, interpretative and vanguard principles have been established in the 
states on the topic of human rights, like the one established in the Constitution of the 
State of Sonora which, in its article 4, Bis-C., in which the principle of non-
contradiction; the clause of consistent interpretation according to international treaties 
attending to the precedents set by the American Court of Human Rights; the principle of 
pondering when in a conflict, two or more different human rights might apply for a 
harmonic interpretation to take place, the same goes for the principle of 
progressiveness. Other federal entities have followed Sonora’s example, such as the 
State of Tlaxcala, which has incorporated the aforementioned principles in article 16.B 
of its state Constitution. 
 
In this subject, the discussion has revolved around the reach of these 
constitutional norms of opening for human dignity and international law. Particularly, 
the debate has focused on the following question: Does it imply or not with the 
aforementioned rules and dispositions the incorporation of international law and its 
dispositions to the rank of Constitutional Law? Some authors claim that, with the 
reform, the incorporation into the constitution or “constitutionalization” of Human 
Rights on the international stage has occurred. Others point out that the rule does not 
imply the constitutionalization of the international regulations, but in fact constitutes a 
particular figure of quasi-constitutionalization or indirect constitutional efficiency. 
Finally, there are those who have sustained that this has purely hermeneutic 
consequences. (NASH ROJAS, C., 2010: 166-167). 
 
However, the Spanish constitutional court’s precedent has adopted a clearer 
stance. It rejects the idea that rules and dispositions contained in international treaties on 
Human Rights may serve as parameters of constitutionality. In this way, the central 
argument of the Spanish Constitutional Court has been that the disposition from article 
10.2 does not bestow constitutional rank to the rights and liberties internationally 
proclaimed when they are not also contained in the Constitution itself, but forces the 
interpretation of the corresponding precepts of it according to the content of the 
aforementioned Treaties or Agreements, therefore in the practice this content turns in a 
certain way in the constitutionally declared content of the rights and liberties announced 
2 About the topic of recommendations resulting from State international responsibility on human rights, 
the work of certain authors is highly recommended (MARTÍN, C., 2004: 79-117) and (CORCUERA 
CABEZUT, S., 2003: 1-112). 
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in chapter second, title I of the Spanish Constitution (STC 36/1991). The main effect of 
this interpretation of article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution will be that, in case of a 
contradiction between a domestic law and a Human Rights treaty, the latter will not 
serve as an argument to justify the unconstitutionality of the domestic law in question, 
since international law is not considered constitutional law (NASH ROJAS, C., 2010: 
167).  
 
The Spanish Constitutional Court has pronounced so in its  STC 28/1991, in 
which it states that: “…while constitutional laws recognize rights and liberties, they 
must be interpreted in accordance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
treaties and international agreements on the subject ratified by Spain (art. 10.2 C.E.), in 
any case would a contradiction between a law and fundamental rights turn the treaty 
“per se” in a measure of constitutionality for the examined law, because such measure 
would still be integrated by the constitutional precept definer of the legal right or 
liberty, if interpreted according to the exact profiles of its content, in conformity with 
the international treaty or agreement” (C 28/19991. B.O.E. 14/02/1991). 
 
Somehow, this jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional Court shows a 
preference for the constitutionality of fundamental rights against its international 
opening. Facing this international expansion, it is relevant to point out that the Mexican 
Constitution has a broader scope of this protection; compared to the Spanish 
Constitution, the Mexican legislation has two performance parameters: the Constitution 
and treaties, the Spanish refers only to treaties. Mexican law despite the two interpretive 
parameters commands the use of pro person principle by applying the standard or 
interpretation most favorable to the person; the Spanish law does not make that 
distinction. Furthermore, human rights standards in Mexico include, in accordance with 
the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution, those of the Commission and of 
human rights treaties; in Spain, only those that the Constitution recognizes. 
Furthermore, human rights laws in Mexico include, in accordance with the first 
paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution, thereof and those of human rights treaties; in 
Spain, only those that the Constitution recognizes. In any case, the example of Mexico 
serves to make a minimum balance of how the Inter-American system is forced to open, 
even more with international scope of reference of rights, than the constitutionality of 
the tightest fundamental rights at international level of European system, particularly 
the Spanish case which still retains the constitutional primacy over international treaties 
(ANSUÁTEGUI ROIG, F. J., 2007: 147-203).3 
 
However, making reference to some legal precedents, on March 14, 2012, the 
Second Hall of the Nation’s Supreme Court of Justice, in the constitutional trial in 
revision 781/2011, decided that when constitutional dispositions on Human Rights are 
deemed as “enough”, it is unnecessary to seek answers in the international instruments 
due to the obligation established by the pro person  principle which says that the most 
3  About the need of opening of the legal systems of European states as a criterion for regional 
internationalization and universal, see: ANSUÁTEGUI ROIG, F. J., 2007: 147-203. 
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favorable dispositions must be considered and this may satisfy the constitutional norms 
as well. 
It has been established in the following “JURISPRUDENCE 2º. XXXIV/2012 
(10A.) HUMAN RIGHTS. THEIR STUDY SINCE THE REFORM TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 1º, PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERATION’S 
OFFICIAL DIARY ON JUNE 10, 2011, DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY THAT 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS SHOULD BE CHECKED, IF IT RESULTS 
ENOUGH TO CHECK THE CONSIDERATIONS THEY HAVE ABOUT THE 
POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE MEXICAN UNITED STATES”, which points 
out that: 
 
“According to what has been established at the article one of the Political 
Constitution of the Mexican United States, since the reform published in the 
Federation’s Official Diary on June 10, 2011, in attention to the pro person principle, it 
doesn’t result necessary to consider the content of international treaties and 
instruments that from part of our legal system, if it is enough the consideration of 
human rights estimated to be violated stated in the General Constitution of the Republic 
and therefore it is enough the study of the constitutional precept that considers the 
situation to determine the constitutionality or not of the act that is complained about”.  
(underlining added). 
 
In these argumentative lines what we see is a restrictive posture of the 
application of the clause of consistent interpretation, by taking the Supreme Court into 
account, an essential element that Eduardo Ferrer points out, in the sense that the 
consistent interpretation is not about an imposition of the international law over the 
domestic one, but of an interpretative process of harmonization which implies even in 
some occasions, stop applying the first one, by resulting of greater protective reach the 
domestic law, according to the pro person principle, and also derived of the general 
obligation of respecting the rights and liberties considered in international treaties, and 
not of considering as the Supreme Court does as “unnecessary”  the contents of 
international treaties. (FERRER MAC-GREGOR, E. 2012: 358-359). 
 
The consistent interpretation either used to determine the unconstitutionality of a 
law, or to apply it to a specific case when it resulted more protective of the person’s 
rights and liberties it must be understood as process of harmonization, it is not about 
“sufficiency” or of “need”, but of a holistic study of rights, meaning, the interpreter 
must seek an interpretation that allows to “harmonize” the “domestic and the 
international law”. It is not about two successive interpretations (first the constitutional 
consistent interpretation and then the one according to the international treaty), but of a 
consistent interpretation that harmonizes both. When the constitutional formula says 
that human rights laws will be interpreted “consistently with “this Constitution and 
international treaties…”, the conjunction “and” grammatically constitutes a “binding 
conjunction”, that works to reunite in a single functional unit two or more homogeneous 
elements by indicating their accession. From there we can conclude that this clause 
meets with the “hermeneutic function” need for harmonization. And amongst the 
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possible consistent interpretations for harmonization, the interpreter must choose for the 
widest protection. (FERRER MAC-GREGOR, E. 2012: 365). 
In the words of Bidart Campos, it constitutes a “conciliatory interpretation” as a 
double highway, therefore making an interpretation “of” the Constitution (human rights 
of constitutional and international source) and “from” de Constitution downhill with the 
sub constitutional law, whose interpretation must be consistent with the Constitution 
and international treaties. (BIDART CAMPOS, G., 2003: 388). The “principle of 
harmonization” on international subjects has been established by the United Nations’ 
Commission of International Law by studying the issue of “fragmentation” of 
international law and it consists in the fact that when several laws on the same subject 
exist such laws must be interpreted as much as possible in a manner that only one series 
of compatible obligations is established. Indeed, it is considered in numeral 29 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights, the pointing that no disposition in that treaty 
may be interpreted to “exclude other rights and legal guarantees that are inherent to the 
human being of that result from the representative democratic form of government” o 
“to exclude or limit the effect that the American Declaration of Men’s Rights and 
Duties and other actions.” 
 
Attending the referred thesis, it is important to point out that even though it 
might not be categorically stipulated in constitutional article one that international 
treaties must be consulted, it is important to consider international treaties as 
background arguments from which a controversy must be solved and not consider them 
as simple additional considerations from the essential argumentative work of judges. In 
addition, the Supreme Court of Justice would have to clarify which are going to be the 
standards of interpretation used by judges. Besides, the Supreme Court of Justice would 
have to clarify which criteria will be used for interpretation by judges to determine 
when the constitutional dispositions on human rights will be enough and it will be 
unnecessary to interpret the contents of international treaties. We consider that with this 
interpretation a resistance from the Supreme Court to apply the instruments of 
international origin is proved, for which it is timely to assure that the constitutional law 
does not only authorize, but in fact forces all judges without exception to directly 
interpret and apply international law on human rights.  
 
The breach of this mandate may generate the State’s international responsibility 
for actions or omissions when these mean a violation to international compromises 
derivatives from treaties on human rights. Judges, as a part of the Mexican State’s 
system, are also submitted to signed and ratified international treaties by Mexico, which 
forces them to look out for the effects that the dispositions of international treaties are 
not restricted by the application of laws, authority actions or omissions, etc. In other 
words, the judiciary must exercise a “control of conventionality.” 
 
In addition to the principle of harmonization, another postulation incorporates 
itself which develops a primordial function, the one that constitutes the “material or 
guarantee principle” regulated by the hermeneutic criterion favor libertati, which tells 
us that rights must be interpreted in the widest way possible for them to be effective, as 
all interpretative difficulties related to human rights cannot be solved with the full 
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interpretation of the international treaty, because many times, both the treaty’s 
dispositions and the constitution’s regulate the same thing, meaning that, it is not more 
precise or more protective, but having both the particular right written on them and 
enounce them in the same terms. In these cases we consider that the interpretations from 
international courts in certain rights must be appealed to, also to the doctrine precedents 
that have been applied on different cases solved by the United Nations’ committees 
enabled to obtain individual communications about human rights violations contained in 
the respective international treaties, because binding effects for domestic systems are 
born from their decisions. 
 
In this way we can see a clause of open interpretation with consistency not only 
with international rights, but also with international precedents, as Eduardo Ferrer Mc-
Gregor has said in his definition of consistent interpretation, that international treaties 
and international precedent make an indivisible binomial. So he defines consistent 
interpretation as an “…hermeneutic technique with which rights and constitutional 
liberties are harmonized with values, principles and rules contained in international 
treaties on human rights signed by States, as well as by precedents from international 
courts (and in certain occasions other resolutions and international sources), to achieve 
its greater efficacy and protection.” (FERRER MAC-GREGOR, E. 2012: 358). 
Nowadays the importance of the in dubio pro libertati principle cannot be argued, and 
favouring fundamental rights, because its aim, as stated by Professor Perez Luño, is to 
achieve the maximum expansion of the constitutional liberties system; principle that, in 
relation with the rule, increases the powers of the judiciary interpreter. (PÉREZ LUÑO, 
A., 1984:101-124)4. 
 
We can affirm that this is the challenge and the most important practical note for 
judges, because today it is acknowledged by the scientific community that law in 
general and most of all constitutional law and international treaties containing human 
rights, contain a really vague language, (ENDICOTT, T., 2003: 179-189), therefore, 
legal indetermination which affects fundamental rights of a certain Constitution, affects 
human rights acknowledged in international treaties even more, because generally in 
international treaties, rights normally appear numbered with no specification about the 
concrete meaning, therefore the role of interpretation from judges is the key (PECES-
BARBA, G., 1999: 578-579). About the wavering of law in the works of (ENDICOTT, 
T., 2007: 237-270), it reinforces the need to design a methodology for the making of 
harmonizing decisions in cases of uncertainty or rights collision; hence the importance 
of the use of criteria emanated from international doctrine precedent in the 
argumentative processes of the Mexican judges. (MIJANGOS Y GONZALEZ, J., 2006: 
420). 
 
4 Other authors related to the subject such as (CASTANEDA OTSU, S., 2002:227), offers us similar 
postures. In the same way, the works of (CABALLERO OCHOA, J.L. 2013: 27), help us have a greater 
comprehension, meaning and reach on the clause of consistent interpretation according to national treaties 
on human rights as mexican legal operators. 
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If with the reform a “constitutionality block” is established made of all those 
laws that allow us to carry out a constitutionality control, meaning that the legal 
systematization of all materially constitutional laws (Constitution, International 
Treaties, pacts, protocols and ordinary legislation); it is transcendental that steps are 
taken towards a block of conventionality, a block of rights integrated that mexican 
judges should take into account. (FERRER MAC.GREGOR, E., 2010: 172). That is, 
speaking more specifically, it has to be pointed out that the obligation for the Mexican 
Judiciary Power of embracing the doctrine precedents from international courts,  
especially those of jurisdictional nature, like in the case of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, but also, the interpretative guides for the application of international 
treaties, known as Soft Law. 
 
 In the subject of human rights, the term soft law, of international origin, makes 
reference to a certain type of instruments or rules that, due to their process of creation 
and who dictates them, do not have the formal and legal characteristic that does 
correspond to the laws contained in international treaties. However, the soft law finds 
itself in a threshold of political and moral obligation, because international laws are 
bound by principles such as jus cogens (imperative rules of international law in 
general). (SCJN. 2012: 1-2). Several rules exist like that, such as the General 
Observations from the monitoring committees of international treaties from the United 
Nations System and the Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Principles and Declarations; rules that must not be considered as strange and 
unrelated to the Mexican legal order, but that must be applied by judges as any other 
Constitutional, treaty, rule or compulsory precedent rule or law. 
 
So it has been established recently by the Third Referee Court of the Twenty-
Seventh Circumscription in the Thesis: XXVII, 3º.6 CS, “SOFT LAW”. THE 
CRITERIA AND DIRECTIONS DEVELOPED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANS IN 
CHARGE OF PROMOTING AND PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ARE 
USEFUL FOR THE STATES TO GUIDE DE PRACTICE AND IMPROVEMENT OF 
THEIR INSTITUTIONS IN CHARGE OF WATCHING, PROMOTING AND 
ENSURING THE UNRESTRICTED ADDICTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS. That on the 
particular issue points out that:  
 
“In conformity with article one of the Political Constitution of the Mexican 
United States and its protective reach on human rights, the agents of the Mexican State 
not only should observe the compulsory international normative and the Inter-American 
precedent, but that in virtue of the maximum rules of universality and progressiveness, 
it must be admitted that the development of principles and practices of international law 
of non-binding nature considered in instruments, declarations, proclaims, uniform 
rules, directions and recommendations accepted by most States. Such principles are 
identified by the doctrine as “soft law”-in English-, light, ductile, soft and it is used due 
to the sense of lack of effective obligation and in opposition to “hard law” or positive 
law. Now, with independence of the obligation that they imply, its content may be useful 
for States to individually guide the practice and improvement of its institutions, which 
watch, promote and guarantee the unrestricted addiction to human rights. Without it 
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implying the ignoring of the primal following of the domestic national order, nor the 
principle of subsidiarity of supranational laws, according to which, the international 
protection of human rights is applicable after exhausted the domestic resources and 
only then, may individuals resort to it, because beyond the fact that the Federal 
Constitution and international treaties do not relate in hierarchy according to the 
country’s Maximum Court in the precedent P./J. 20/2014 (10º.)(*), the consultation of 
non-binding directions only reports practical effects derived from experience of the 
international organizations in charge of promoting and protecting fundamental rights”. 
(underlining added). 
 
Now, how can we interpret and give the rule or law a certain meaning through 
all possible interpretation criteria, if we ignore the existence of legal instruments and 
precedent criteria? This leads us to another of the great challenges for the Judiciary 
Power in this subject and a fundamental and practical note, that is to say, the knowledge 
obtained from the content and reach of international treaties and from the precedents of 
international courts and interpretative rules by judges (soft law). However, the 
application of the human rights treaties deserve a special mention, in the past few years, 
slowly but surely, the organs of the Mexican Judiciary Federal Power and specifically 
from the Referee Circuit Courts by incorporating in their sentences, human rights 
considered in the American Convention and the precedent criteria of the Inter-American 
Court. That is how federal courts have made use of the inter-american heritage on 
human rights normally for novelty and protective interpretations. About the precedents 
coming from inter-american courts talking about human rights and their reception by 
Mexican federal courts. (MIJANGOS AND GONZALEZ, J., 2006:411-424). 
 
      Unquestionably, with the obligation of judges to interpret consistently with 
international treaties on human rights, several duties arise regarding their application by 
the judiciary power, a generic duty to respect, protect and guarantee rights contained in 
international treaties, according to the nature, sense and reach given to the rules 
themselves; also the modification of administration practices and of judiciary criteria. 
The use or management of international treaties and precedent criteria, what is done 
with them, has to be general for all judges from the judiciary power; besides the 
minimal standards of factual identity must be reached with the matters judges solve and 
find the criteria that occupy the same protected rights which are being interpreted 
arriving to adequate conclusions with the object and purposes of treaties that need to be 
attended. In addition, it is primordial to find uniformity in the use of international 
treaties and the value given to rights contained in the treaties themselves, in the judges’ 
projects.  
 
II. A GENERAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION ADVANCED FORMULA FROM A 
HUMAN RIGHTS DOGMATIC 
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Certainly there are many rules, principles or objective criteria of interpretation,5 
so it is difficult to find a fully effective formula that can be applied to specific cases; 
however when it is interpreted in accordance with international treaties certain methods 
are followed, such as the general rule of interpretation regulated in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between international organizations. This systematic articulates with 
the fact that the techniques of interpretation contained in Article 31 when identifying or 
determining significance or meaning to the provision of a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the terms of the Treaty in the context and taking into 
account the object and purpose. 
  
Let's see: 
 
“General rule of interpretation. I. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and considering its object and purpose. 2. For the purposes of the interpretation 
of a treaty. a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty: the context, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes comprise b) any instrument which was made 
by one or more parties celebrate the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty; 3. together with the context, shall be taken into 
account: a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions: b) any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty: c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
relations between the parties. 4. given to a term a special meaning if it is established 
that such was the intention of the parties". (Bold added). 
 
The following criteria derive from general Rule of Interpretation: 
 
Textual criteria (t-c)   Contextual criteria (c-c)    Object and purpose (o-p) 
 
The function of these criteria as established on the above provision is that when 
interpreting, i.e. attributing a sense or meaning to the text of an international treaty, 
arguments or interpretation techniques to be applied in one combined operation are the 
three criteria we have noted: the text, context, object and purpose. The function of these 
criteria as established on the above provision is that when interpreting, i.e. attributing a 
sense or meaning to the text of an international treaty, arguments or interpretation 
techniques to be applied in one combined operation are the three criteria we have noted: 
the text, context, object and purpose.6. 
5 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983, 
stated that the method of interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention is covered by the primacy of 
the text, i.e., to apply objective criteria interpretation. 
6  Case Gonzalez and others ("Cotton Field") vs. Mexico, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
judgment of 16 November 2009, para. 42, p, 12. Cf.. "Other treaties" Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction 
of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of September 
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Since the identification of these three criteria we approach to develop a General 
Formula Advanced Interpretation through the combination of these criteria and other 
values represented in the following formula: 
 
Formula 
 
The approach of the formula presented is linear and punctual in their variables; 
however, this can be considered a first step towards the design of a more elaborated 
model that considers more variables and different relationships between the application 
of criteria and an interpretation from the scientific treatment of human rights. 
 
 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) + 𝑛𝑛 − 𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐
�(𝑖𝑖) + 𝑜𝑜 − 𝑝𝑝~𝑟𝑟  �   [𝑁𝑁] 
  
Definitions 
 
This section defines the concepts necessary to understand the model proposed. 
The definitions presented here can be contrasted with the formal criteria that are used in 
mathematical models. 
 
 
(NF)     “Normative formulation” It is the norm that expresses the text. 
 
 
(N-C)  “Normative criterion "determines a 
meaning to the specific normative 
statements. 
 
 
(C-n)¹    “textual Criteria”. 
(C-n) ²   “lógical Criteria”. 
(C-n) ᶾ   “historical criteria”. 
              (C-n) 4   “systematic criteria” 
 
(C-C) “Contextual criteria" assigns a meaning or normative meanings taking into 
account axiological categories, Principlist, extralegal factors and the global 
context of constitutional and conventional law ". 
 
 
(I)    "Interpretive statement" is the product of the activity to interpret and ascribe 
meaning to the (N-C) y (C-C)  
 
 
24, 1982. Series A No. 1 paragraph 43-48; Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4.2 and 4.4 American 
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3, para 
47-50; Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of Costa Rica related to naturalization. Advisory 
Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, paragraph 20 -24, and, among others, Velásquez 
Rodríguez v Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Serie C No. 1, paragraph 30. 
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(O-P) “Object and purpose” determines the content and scope of a right, principle or 
value against the particular case to reach a [N] 
 
 
 (~𝐫𝐫)  ”Rational approach” justifies the passage of the interpretive statements giving 
reasons for reaching the standard [N] 
 
[N] " Decision norm”7 is the end result of interpretation. 
 
 
A description and a concise analysis of the articulation of each of the variables 
and their relevance to the interpretative activity of judges is presented.  
 
 
Applicative modeling of variables: emphasis on contextual criteria (c-c) 
 
 
There is no doubt that today's interpretation is a fundamental component in the 
law that demands a cognitive activity and practice also;8 so that we can say that the 
interpretation from the point of view neoconstitutional, is a fundamental task of legal 
operators as a norm [N] 9 - at least from a legal doctrine of human rights-, is the 
interpretation that gives a Tribunal to one or several legal provisions of a normative 
formulation (nf), Which it is the norm expressing the text, and can be: constitutions, 
laws, codes, international treaties; which are combined with normative criteria (n-c), 
(grammatical or textual, logical, historical and systematic)10; criteria that determine a 
meaning to the specific policy statements, or justifying the meaning assigned to a legal 
provision. 
 
It is important to note that these notoriously plausible interpretation criteria and 
methods used by legal operators are bounded within a legal system with new paradigms 
of interpretation for the solution of essentially controversial cases especially on human 
rights;11 as a result of admission to the Constitution of principles, values and standards 
7 A decision norm [N] it fully out the interpretation process to its peak, i.e., the legal norm occurs to apply 
to a particular case. This application is made by formulating a court decision, a judgment that expresses 
the decision rule [N]. Thus, the judge is the one that goes beyond mere interpretation and production of 
legal norms, to extract therefrom decision rules; this type of judge is that Kelsen called "authentic 
interpreter", ie the judge. (GRAU, Eros), 2007:18).   
8  On the implications of the interpretation and argumentation in the modern conception of law vine; 
(ATIENZA, M., 2007).  By the same author, vine; (2011).  
9 To Guastini the "disposition" is any statement pertaining to a source of law and considers that the 
"norm" means the content meaning of the provision, its meaning, which is a dependent variable of 
interpretation. In this regard, the provision is the object of the interpretive activity, and the standard, its 
result. On the concept of "standard" and "disposition" see the work (GUASTINI, 2012: 10-11).  
10 Regulatory criteria are rooted in Savigny, who highlighted the existence of four criteria: grammatical, 
logical, historical and systematic,, (SAVIGNY, F. 2009) 
11   The literal method. In the letter of the law is nonexistent weighting principles. The systematic 
approach, which seeks a reiteration in the vision of strong and perfect legal system, lacking gaps and 
contradictions. The originalist method. In which the constitutional originalism is now a legal 
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of interpretation that generated the constitutional reform of June 10, 2011, a change 
required by the interpretive dynamic judges to strengthen the material content of the 
Constitution, and therefore the role of argumentation and application of modern 
hermeneutical methods in judicial proceedings. Indeed, Konrad Hess notes that the 
methods of constitutional interpretation should not be limited to those classic criteria of 
normative interpretation as (the literal, teleological, systematic and historical) but 
should incorporate a set of principles, criteria, methods and novel reasoning inform the 
hermeneutical exercise of constitutional judges.12 
 
In this sense it propose the need for the application of contextual criteria (c-c) or 
systematic, from which normative meanings are assigned taking into account the 
identification of one or more norms, purposes, values, constitutional principles are more 
abstract and in which moral, legal, political and social objectives are expressed from a 
universal character. Based on these criteria the interpreter must seek the reasonable 
sense of normative formulation (nf) within the context of conventional systemic 
constitutional law and subject to a systematic and purposive interpretation. 
 
 Also in the contextual criteria (c-c), when interpreting takes into account the 
social, axiological arguments, situations and certain requirements, human behavior, 
sociological use of the norm –as you well holds the Inter-American Court– the 
interpretation has to be coupled with the changing times and current living conditions.13  
 
The application of contextual criteria of the position that human rights are not 
only normative legal instruments with an ethical justification, but they are also a social 
reality. In this sense they help us measure the effectiveness of the rule, the influence of 
law on social reality, or conversely the impact of reality on the Law.14  
 
Thus, for example, a contextual approach has been expressed in some way in the 
following jurisprudential reasoning of the Supreme Court in the "THESIS: 1ª 
/J.43//2015 (10ª.) MARRIAGE. FEDERAL LAW OF ANY ENTITY THAT, ON ONE 
SIDE, CONSIDER THAT THE PURPOSE OF THAT ONE IS THE PROCREATION 
AND / OR THAT DEFINE AS HELD BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN, IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL”, that sustains thereon:  
 
interpretation methodology, based on a historicist worn XIX century romanticism. (FLORES 
SALDAÑA, A., 2014: 113-114). 
12 On neo-constitutional interpretation models (HESSE. K., 1992: 45-47). 
13 The Inter-American Court in the judgment in the Case of the "Mapiripán vs. Slaughter Colombia has 
argued that human rights treaties are "living instruments whose interpretation must consider the changes 
of the times and current living conditions. Such evolutionary interpretation is consistent with the general 
rules of interpretation enshrined in Article 29 of the American Convention, as well as those established by 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties "Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Case" Slaughter 
of Mapiripán vs. Colombia), judgment of 15 September 2005, par. 106, p. 90.  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_134_esp.pdf Accessed on May 3, 2016. 
14 On the social reality of human rights as a postulate of three-dimensional theory (PECES-BARBA 
MARTÍNEZ, G., 1999: 84).  
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“Consider the purpose of marriage it is procreation constitutes a measure not 
suitable to fulfill the unique constitutional purpose for which the measure could obey: 
the protection of the family as a social reality. Pretending to link the requirements of 
marriage to the sexual preferences of those who can access the institution of marriage 
to procreation is discriminatory ... "(Underline and bold added) 
 
We see the Court's interpretative statement (i) to come, that is, to be interpreted 
as unconstitutional all legal provisions of the states to establish that the purpose of 
marriage is procreation for being exclusionary and discriminatory; the Court 
disapproves procreation as incapable as not suitable to fulfill the constitutional purpose 
for which can be adjusted this provision, which is the protection of the family as a social 
reality, which requires that in this context homosexual couples are in a equal or similar 
position to that heterosexual couples in access to marriage. In this criterion we see the 
reasoning changes in relation to the context; what was "rational" in the past, ie, the 
same-sex marriage whose purpose was procreation; It is now "irrational" because this 
category is not inherent in the rational design of what marriage is currently based on the 
jurisprudence of the Court. 
 
Also the "contextual approach" can be used as a parameter to determine the 
international responsibility of a State for acts committed by individuals or to measure 
their response or behavior in a situation where there is a real or immediate risk;15 thus 
we see how the Court in the case Gonzalez and others ("Cotton Field") vs. Mexico uses 
the "context" and analyzes all the factual context of the case and the conditions under 
which the facts were given for attributing to the State and engage its international 
responsibility accordingly.  
 
The Court warned in his remarks that the facts of the case were generated within 
a context of widespread and pervasive crime on violence against women in Ciudad 
Juarez, Mexico; a social, political and economic context of violence and systematic 
discrimination against women within which occurred murders and disappearances of 
women reported 2003 CEDAW and Amnesty International, the NGOs recorded about 
400 cases in the period 1993 -2003.16 Fundamental to the Court is how respondents 
officials and state authorities even knowing this context, minimizing the problem, 
showing a disinterest in diligently address complaints of disappearances of women; and 
to set 72 hours to officially declare a woman missing in this context is irrational for the 
Court, ie, the state did not act reasonably in its obligation to ensure in this context. 
Precisely in this regard, the Court notes that:  
 
“…the State, given the context of the case, was informed that there was a real 
and immediate risk that the victims were sexually abused, subjected to ill-treatment and 
15 The scope of the context to determine the international responsibility of a State see the Gonzalez case 
and others ("Cotton Field") vs. Mexico, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of 16 
November 2009. http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_205_esp.pdf Accessed on April 
26, 2016.  
16  Report on Mexico produced by CEDAW, supra note 64, folio 1928 and Amnesty International, 
Intolerable killings, supra note 64, folio 2253. 
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killed. The Court considers that there arises a duty of due diligence strict regard to 
reports of missing women to such context regarding their search during the first hours 
and the first days…”17. (Underlining added). 
 
This breach of the obligation to ensure is serious because of the context of which 
the State had knowledge; context which placed women in a situation of extreme 
vulnerability and in which the three killings occurred based on gender that gave rise to 
this case. It is important to note that the context is used by the Court as a parameter to 
measure how serious was the real and immediate risk, and if as a result of state action in 
this context or not there was actual harm by failing to establish the general prevention 
measures to guarantee the personal integrity and human rights of women victims of this 
context.  
 
Likewise they can be used as contextual approach "systematic violence" 
exercised against women as absolving measure when judging in criminal proceedings 
for murder; precisely the argument and legal interpretation with a gender perspective 
requires an argument that goes beyond the application of a rule to a particular case; 
involves questioning the supposed neutrality of standards, the establishment of an 
adequate legal framework to solve in the most attached to human rights and equality 
and non-discrimination; also it is taken into account as a criterion of legitimacy of the 
judicial exercise to justify differential treatment and give reasons why it is necessary to 
apply certain rules to a given context or facts18. 
 
  In this sense, although the meanings are connected, what is is to extend the 
understanding, determine the scope, extent, sense or meaning of any normative 
formulation (nf) assigning a value to each of the criteria normative (cn) and contextual 
criteria (cc) to result from this process of interpreting an interpretative statement (i) 
which is the product of the activity to interpret and ascribe meaning to the normative 
standards and contextual.19 Phrasing interpretive (i) to be confronted with the object and 
purpose (o-p) that will determine the content and scope of rights, values and 
constitutional principles, and thus its effective ness, such as: determining the value of 
equality between spouses;20 the scope of the principle pro person to distinguish the 
favorability of a rule or the least restrictive interpretation, the scope of the principle of 
universality to know when to expand the number of holders of a human right. 
 
Similarly, the object and purpose (o-p) help us determine what is "family", to 
distinguish the "preferred position" of the subjects in the case to protect the right to self-
image and to privacy / privacy; or to determine whether the "procreation" is inherent in 
17 Case Gonzalez and others ("Cotton Field") vs. Mexico, par. 283: 74. 
18 On how to judge gender perspective see Protocol for Judging with a Gender Perspective, Realizing the 
right to equality, (Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, 2015). 
19  On the concept and uses of interpretive statements vid; Guastini, Riccardo, studies on the legal 
interpretation, (GUASTINI, 2012:10-11)  
20 On the content and scope of equality between spouses, see the precedent of the Supreme Court of 
Justice of the Nation in Isolated Thesis No.. 1ª. LXIII/2016 (10ª.) published on March 11, 2016 in the 
Gazette of the Federation Judicial Weekly; https://www.scjn.gob.mx/libreria/Paginas/semanarioauto.aspx 
Consulted on page 21 April 2016..  
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the rational design of the figure of marriage;21 Also, the object and purpose (o-p) will 
help us to justify the "relevance judgments"22 before a different legal treatment of two 
people and not conflict with the principle of equality and non-discrimination; to set 
limits to an "autonomy" that wants to manifest in the case of the legalization of 
marijuana use for recreational purposes;23 or, what it is to be "person" in the case of 
establishing the scope of human dignity in the development of emerging technologies to 
improve the lives of human beings, such as computers and the internet, biomedicine, 
neuroscience, nanoscience and nanotechnology and robotics; 24  to, have a rational 
approximation (~ r) give us the reasons for the passage of the interpretive statements to 
a decision norm [N], substantiated, adequately justified in a particular case. 
 
From this scheme, the interpretation becomes subject to interpretation, and that 
interpretation is a polysemy (FERRER, MAC-GREGOR, E., 2005: XV), that is, we 
must understand the standard in not only a regulatory system but also, as says Hesse 
taking into account dimensions or theoretical categories that give it meaning, that give 
coherence and to Hesse interpret is "concretize" precisely the interpretation must be 
linked to the object and the problem, which is why Konrad Hesse interpretation is 
'concretization' (Konkretisierung); in this sense for Hesse "which does not appear 
clearly as the content of the Constitution it is to be determined by incorporating the 
'reality' whose management it is"(HESSE, K., 1983: 43-44). So that concretization is to 
complete, adjust, give coherence to incomplete provision in a normative formulation 
through a creative activity, resulting in a dynamic performer in accordance with the 
constitutional and conventional rule. But the concretization is not the goal that it wants 
to reach; the concretization only reaches its fullness, when the decision norm [N] is 
defined able to resolve the conflict which is the essence of the case. That's why for Grau 
interpretation and concretization are part of the same process. There is no currently 
interpretation of the law without concretization, as this is its final stage. (GRAU, E., 
2007: 19). 
 
In sum, which aims this General Formula Advanced Interpretation is thereby 
contribute it is minimal to the judges use these criteria in their practical reasoning way, 
allowing them to determine the scope and meaning of one or more legal provisions 
normative formulations , and hereby apply them appropriately to reach a constitutional 
outcome and conventionally correct, ensuring its objectivity, legal certainty and 
predictability and a much broader perspective of the principles and postulating values 
human rights within this new paradigm of contemporary legal reasoning. 
 
 
21 On the purpose of marriage see the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, Thesis: 
1st /J.43/2015, First Chamber, Tenth Epoch, published Friday June 19, 2015 in the Gazette Judicial 
Weekly Federation; https://www.scjn.gob.mx/libreria/Paginas/semanarioauto.aspx page consulted on 26 
April 2016. 
22 On relevance judgments should see the work of (LAPORTA F., 985: 20-24). 
23 On regulation of consumption of marijuana for "recreational or recreational purposes", see the decision 
of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of Amparo in Review 237/2014.   
24 On the problems and demands posed by the current law in the context of emerging technologies (DE 
ASÍS, R., 2015).  
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II.1. The interpretation of human rights as an open to the public and social power 
challenge 
 
 
However, interpretation is no longer an activity of the judge, rather, it originates 
in all levels of the legal system, through a gradual process of identifying standards, 
general and abstract of the Constitution to the most particular and concrete until the 
individual mandate of the judge or any state authority. 
 
Clearly, from the constitutional reform of 2011 the interpretation and application of 
constitutional norms and principles is no longer reserved only for judges; so we see in 
Article 1 third paragraph of the Mexican Constitution expressly states the obligation of all 
authorities “[…]to promote, to respect, to protect and to guarantee human rights in 
accordance with the principles of universality, interdependence, indivisibility and 
progressiveness […]”;so that the response of the authority before a particular event in 
which they have to safeguard the observance of human rights must apply these 
interpretive guidelines that maximize performance under these fundamental principles 
of international scope, extending in this way for all kind of authority including the duty 
to apply administrative control of constitutionality / conventionality. In this sense the 
Court in the judgment of monitoring compliance with the Gelman case vs. Uruguay 
from February 24, 2013, determined that the scope of conventionality control ex officio 
is not reserved solely for legal operators, but extends to any authority of direct or 
indirect democratic representation having as action limit the scope of its powers. In its 
judgment the Court referred to in paragraph 66 states that:  
 
“[…]when a State is party to an international treaty such as the American 
Convention, all its organs, including its judges and other bodies linked to the 
administration of justice at all levels, are also subject to the treaty, which requires them 
to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the Convention are not affected by the 
application of rules contrary to its object and purpose, so that judicial or administrative 
decisions do not illusory full or partial compliance with international obligations. That 
is, all the state authorities are obliged to exercise ex officio "conventionality control" 
between domestic norms and the American Convention, in the framework of their 
respective competences and the corresponding procedural regulations. In this task, they 
should take into account not only the treaty but also the interpretation thereof made by 
the Inter-American Court, final interpreter of the American Convention”.25 (underlining 
added). 
 
In this sense, Häberle through his thesis of constitutional interpretation as a public 
process and the thesis of the open society of constitutional interpretation, diametrically 
increases the radius of performers, including all public powers, (judges, legislators, 
managers, lawyers, public institutions, citizens, public bodies, civil society, etc.) insofar as 
they are key players as open as the criteria pluralistic society. In this sense the concept of 
25  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of monitoring compliance with the Gelman case vs. 
Uruguay from February 24, 2013, par.. 66:19.  
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interpretation is based Häberle with the following formula: who lives the norm [N] (co) 
also plays. In this sense, for Häberle interpretation must go beyond a directed activity 
consciously and intentionally to understanding and understanding of a norm [N] (from 
textual criteria ), it takes a broader interpretation, more realistic concept where public 
powers above are included. While the responsibility lies with interpreting constitutional 
justice ultimately interpretive theory has to be guaranteed from a democratic theory and 
thus interact. In short for Häberle there is no interpretation of the Constitution but there are 
active citizens where public powers referred to above are included. (HÄBERLE, P., 
2008:31-32).  
 
Thus, specific challenges for the judiciary and public powers to these guidelines 
become relevant from the constitutional reform are many, Human International Law has 
been consolidating in a paced manner, that is why a continuous capacitation by the 
Judiciary Power is needed and it reflects upon the jurisdictional and professional 
activity of its members. The Nation’s Supreme Justice Court had already interpreted in 
the file “several” (SCJN. 912/2010) the relationship between the precedents from the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights when sentences where the Mexican State are a 
part of, and the guiding effect of the resolutions where it is not. In this sense, and 
attending the solved by the Supreme Court in the Thesis Contradiction (SCJN. 
293/2011: 96), it will be primordial to study the reach of such criteria, guiding and 
bonding of the precedents of the Court, to obtain the instruments that help use them in 
domestic sentences. 26 
 
It is important to indicate that international jurisprudence is a useful tool when it 
comes applying and interpreting human rights, both those recognized in the Constitution 
as in international treaties. Meanwhile in the results of the contradictory thesis 293/2011 
the assumptions have been established within which they must be addressed, observed 
and applied the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
IACHR Court has given some guidelines about the case Castañeda Gutman vs. United 
States of Mexico, the court itself that can be taken into account by the judiciary power 
as effective tools that give greater clarity all that it implies. (CASTILLA JUAREZ, K., 
2010: 219-243). Besides in this way, we postulate the thesis of obligation by the 
jurisdictional organs to apply the Consultive Opinions emitted by the Inter-American 
Court, considering that in this function, the Court has emitted criteria in the 
interpretation of certain articles of the American Convention of Human Rights and other 
international treaties, what is what dimensions the jurisdictional work of protecting 
people’s human rights. For example the opening to precedents from international courts, 
the Spanish Constitutional Court in the /STC 36/1984) established that the precedent 
from the European Court of Human Rights might be understood within the mentions of 
article 10.2 C. It was confirmed in the (STC 114/1984), in the precedent of said court 
that the valid criterion considered for the interpretation related to (art. 10.2 CE). Since 
then the Spanish Constitutional Court has used the precedents from the European Court 
of Human Rights as a criterion of interpretation for numerous sentences. 
26 About the binding of precedents from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and their derivative 
reach, (SCJN.293/2011:96) check (ANGULO LOPEZ, G., 2014: 1-26). 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 6 (June 2016) pp. 1-23   ISSN: 2340-9592   DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.v0i6.2920     18  
                                                        
GEOFREDO ANGULO LÓPEZ 
 
Facing the new conditions established by the Supreme Court of Justice regarding 
the Inter-American Court’s precedent, we await the necessary adjustments that the new 
international scenery offers and that precedents acquire practical use for Mexican 
judges.  
 
Furthermore, we consider the use of the conventionality control as an invaluable 
instrument for judges to be able to apply the clause of consistent interpretation. The 
control of conventionality is an institution, a debugging mechanism created by the 
international courts with the objective of having domestic courts to evaluate and 
compare domestic law with supranational law in order to look after the useful effect of 
international instruments, exercising an ex officio control, meaning that, an analysis of 
normative confrontation of internal law (local laws, constitutions, constitutional reform 
projects, administration actions, etc.) with the American Convention, being competent 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on an international location and the internal 
judge in a national location. 
 
This diffuse control of conventionality has been developed by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights since 2006, since the case Almonacid Arellano and 
others c.Chile, and with the Sentence of the case Radilla Pacheco vs the Mexican 
United States of November 23, 2009, the one that distinguishes itself for being the first 
resolution dictated against the Mexican state in which the judiciary power is directly 
bound to the obligation of repair measures, as well to apply a Conventionality Control. 
(REY CANTOR, E., 2008: LII-LIII). We can’t deduct importance to the seven 
sentences emitted by the Inter-American Court against the Mexican state between 2008 
and 2010 stand out for the lack of effective judiciary mechanisms for the defense of 
human rights. These are: Castaneda Gutman, sentence of preliminary exceptions, 
background, repairs and costs, from November 23, 2009; Case Fernandez Ortega and 
Others, sentence of preliminary exceptions, background, repairs and costs, from August 
30, 2010, Case Rosendo Cantu and Other, sentences of preliminary exception, 
background, repairs and costs, from August 31, 2010; Case Cabrera Garcia and 
Montiel Flores, sentence of preliminary exception, background, repairs and costs, from 
November 26, 2010, Case García Cruz y Sánchez Silvestre, sentence of background, 
repairs and costs, from November 26, 2013. (AA.VV. 2010: 1-200).  
 
I believe that the decision in this topic that the Inter-American Court offers in 
the Radilla Pacheco Case is far more than acceptable, perfectly usable in very situation 
mentioned, regarding consistent interpretation, in the sense that the conventionality 
control means the use of an international treaty, in this case the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights (Pact of Saint Joseph) uses a parameter of control to 
consider their compatibility with laws, acts and omissions from a certain authority. 
Precisely the context in which it applies this conventionality control finds itself immerse 
in article one from the constitution and has a particularity, because it forces judges to 
harmonize the rights which have a constitutional basis with the ones acknowledged in 
international treaties. And from the same it results that if a contradiction should arise, 
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laws should adopt the stance that favors humans the most. (CARBONELL M., 2013: 
20-60). 
 
In this transit towards the constitutional avant-gardism, it is no longer adequate 
for an interpretation of the present system of fundamental rights, the positivist approach, 
ciphered in a mechanic attitude based on syllogistic conclusions, but a greater 
participation from the interpreter throughout the design and development of the status is 
needed. Human rights no longer fulfil with their concretion, the demands of values 
higher than the legal order, such as dignity, equality, freedom, solidarity and others 
which must be acknowledged positively and correctly interpreted and guaranteed 
through the procedural way in the States, in both domestic and international levels in 
order to imbue them with effectiveness. 
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